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level of end-user prices. Therefore, we apply diﬀerent dynamic estimators
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11 Introduction
Ownership unbundling has been one of the most important issues in the discussions
preceding the third legislative package for European energy markets. With ownership
unbundling as the strictest regulatory regime of vertical disintegration the company
who owns and operates the transmission assets is fully separated from the rest of the
system meaning that it has no further business activities in retail or production and
import1. On the one hand, the European Commission strongly argued in favour of
ownership unbundling for gas and electricity transmission networks, preferring it to legal
unbundling, which had been the minimum standard in the previous Directive. Having
investigated the gas and electricity sectors, the Commission was dissatisﬁed with market
outcomes, especially in the gas sector. The status of unbundling of transmission system
operators was identiﬁed as one major obstacle to a well-functioning market environment
(European Commission, 2007, 2008). On the other hand, several transmission system
operators (TSOs) and countries, e.g. Germany and France, opposed these eﬀorts of
the Commission, doubting the economic beneﬁts and raising juridical arguments against
ownership unbundling. The package was adopted in summer 2009 and is entering into
force in 2011 allowing now for both legal and ownership unbundling, and leaving the
choice to Member States. Though a ﬁnal agreement on the package has been reached,
the question as to whether ownership unbundling is superior to legal unbundling remains
on the political agenda. Therefore, the problem has not been solved.
From an economic point of view, ownership unbundling would be preferable if it
increased net social welfare. An intuitive indicator for a positive welfare eﬀect is if the
introduction of ownership unbundling leads to lower end-user prices.2 Economic theory
gives little guidance as ambiguous results are reported (cf. e.g. Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993;
Vickers, 1995; Buehler, 2005; H¨ oﬄer and Kranz, 2011). On the one hand, it is argued
that the stricter vertical separation is designed, the less incentive a network operator has
to discriminate between aﬃliated companies and third parties. Thus, competition on
down- and upstream markets will be fostered and the risk of vertical foreclosure reduced.
On the other hand, ownership unbundling may lead to a loss of economies of scope and
thus of operational eﬃciency. The net welfare eﬀects, however, are sensitive to model
assumptions and depend on, for instance, assumptions about the intensity of competition
in the downstream market, on the demand function, on the role of investments or on
the design of access price regulation.
Thus, the impact of vertical separation remains an empirical question. Since some
countries already have established ownership unbundling (e.g. U.K.) and others have
not (e.g. France), the question can be answered empirically. For that, we construct
1 The weakest form is accounting unbundling meaning that the utility has to set up separate accounts
only for diﬀerent services. Legal unbundling requires that the diﬀerent services have to be operated
by separate companies which can still belong to the same owner.
2 Please note that lower end-user prices are not a suﬃcient condition for higher social welfare as
investments may be negatively aﬀected (cf. e.g. Buehler et al., 2004, 2006). For the purpose of this
paper, we concentrate on retail prices, however.
2a panel out of 18 EU3 countries spanning a time interval of 19 years. To isolate the
eﬀect of ownership unbundling, we gather data from national regulators and introduce
a dummy variable which explicitly diﬀerentiates ownership unbundling from any other
form of vertical integration or separation. In addition, we analyse the eﬀect of other
regulatory instruments as the degree of market opening, public or private ownership
of the transmission system operator (TSO), negotiated or regulated third-party access
(TPA) and whether any restrictions to market entry exist upstream. As regulatory
reforms might take some time to become price eﬀective (cf. e.g. Joskow, 2008), we also
calculate the dynamic eﬀects in terms of long run multipliers. Additionally, we control
for diﬀerences among countries’ economic performance, the structure of the gas sector
(e.g. gas export and import) and the oil price, as in several countries gas contracts are
indexed to oil prices.
To analyse the eﬀect of ownership unbundling on retail prices4, we face various econo-
metric challenges, i.e. cluster correlation (I), a potential endogeneity bias (II) and a
small sample bias (III). Therefore, we (I) apply a static ﬁxed eﬀects estimator with
robust standard errors (Froot, 1989 and Williams, 2000), and the System Generalized
Method of Moments estimator (system GMM, Blundell and Bond, 1998) which uses
lagged variables as instruments (II). A bias-corrected least-squares dummy variable es-
timator (LSDVC, Bruno, 2005) allows us to compensate for the small sample bias (III)
in Instrumental Variable estimation. This threefold estimation strategy ensures more
robust results than a single estimator strategy.
Our paper contributes to the literature analysing the eﬀects of reforms in energy
regulation on ﬁnal customer prices in three ways. First, this paper is the ﬁrst that
explicitly models ownership unbundling. Second, in contrast to comparable previous
studies we address the potential endogeneity problem of regulatory reforms. Third,
our paper is the ﬁrst to identify long-run eﬀects of reforms by calculating dynamic
multipliers, addressing a natural lag between the introduction of a regulatory regime
and its eﬀect.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We start with an overview of
existing studies that empirically assess regulatory reforms in the energy sector. Section 4
presents the dataset and some descriptive analyses with a focus on regulatory indicators.
The applied econometric approaches and the results are discussed in section 5. Finally,
we conclude.
2 Related Literature
A change of the regulatory framework of an industry, such as the introduction of own-
ership unbundling in the gas sector, is justiﬁed if it improves social welfare. In many
3 In an earlier version of this paper we included other OECD countries as well. By interviews of the
designated regulatory authorities it turned out that none of these countries has introduced ownership
unbundling for gas TSOs, but show ambiguous regulatory structures.
4 We use the terms end-user prices for household customers and retail prices synonymously throughout
the text.
3countries worldwide, both energy sectors - electricity and gas - have passed through a
radical liberalisation process. Countries have chosen diﬀerent approaches not only with
regard to implemented measures but also with regard to speed and timing. However,
empirical studies on the price eﬀect of the liberalisation process in the energy sectors
are rather rare (an overview is provided in Table 1). The three studies on gas will be at
the centre of the following discussion.
Copenhagen Economics (2005) has been the ﬁrst investigating the determinants of
natural gas end-user prices. Copenhagen Economics has developed its own indicator
capturing regulatory reforms, the so-called Market Opening Index (MOI) for 14 Euro-
pean countries. The indicator is scaled between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating full market
opening. The explanatory variables are modelled with a lag of one year and a ﬁxed
eﬀects estimator is applied. Privatisation and competitive tariﬀ structures tend to de-
crease end-user prices. However, regulation of these prices shows an increasing eﬀect,
quite the opposite of what is usually intended. The indices which cover information on
the unbundling of networks are not signiﬁcant. Due to the high level of aggregation,
it is diﬃcult to identify eﬀects of a single regulatory measure like the introduction of
ownership unbundling. Therefore, results remain vague. Furthermore, the construction
of the indicator lacks transparency and seems to be based - at least partly - on individual
judgements.
Like the majority of studies of liberalisation in developed countries (OECD or EU), a
recent paper by Brau et al. (2010) relies on the OECD database, indicators of regulation
in energy, transport and communications (ETCR), as it is publicly available and provides
for consistency. This database covers a broad range of regulatory areas, i.e. entry
regulation, public ownership, vertical integration and market structure. Each of these
four main indicators consists of three sub-indicators.5 As the weighting procedure as
well as the coding provided by the OECD data is somehow arbitrary and results are
sensitive to these issues, Brau et al. advocate the application of sub-indicators and the
adjustment of the actual coding in light of the speciﬁc research question to be analysed
while most previous studies rely on the aggregate indicators and the OECD coding.6 The
authors compare two sources for residential end-user prices in the gas sector - Eurostat
and the International Energy Agency (IEA) - and ﬁnd hardly any evidence of beneﬁcial
eﬀects of regulatory measures on European end-user prices. Instead, privatisation tends
to increase prices. However, Brau et al. neglect two important sub-indicators: the
existence of market barriers for entrants and the regime of third party access (TPA),
5 The OECD database provides regulatory indicators for seven network industries, i.a. electricity
and gas, for 29 OECD countries. The overall structure of the indicators is the same across sectors.
Concerning gas, each of the 12 sub-indicators is coded 0, 3 or 6 with the highest score of 6 indicating
the most restrictive conditions regarding competition. For aggregation equal weights are used except
for the indicator for vertical integration. See Conway and Nicoletti (2006) for further details.
6 Looking at two earlier studies on the electricity sector by Steiner (2001) and Hattori and Tsutsui
(2004), with the latter being more or less a re-evaluation of the former, gives some indication
regarding this line of argument. While Hattori and Tsutsui deﬁne the unbundling variable to be 1
if legal unbundling has been established, Steiner already regards accounting unbundling as a form
of vertical separation leading to the detection of reverse eﬀects for unbundling and the introduction
of a power exchange.
4both of which are crucial for market entry conditions. Therefore, estimations may face
an omitted variable problem. Furthermore, the authors rely on the three OECD sub-
indicators of vertical integration which do not explicitly cover ownership unbundling of
TSOs. This will be discussed in the next section.
Concerning the empirical methods applied, Table 1 shows that dynamic panel ap-
proaches like GMM or LSDVC have become popular as they are generally capable of
dealing with the endogeneity problem of dynamic price processes. Reforms of the regu-
latory framework not only inﬂuence end-user prices or investments, they might also be
driven by these variables.7 Indeed, only Cambini and Rondi (2010) eﬀectively model reg-
ulatory indicators as endogenous regressors in the dynamic setting.8 Their approach is
diﬀerent to ours, however, as they concentrate on the inﬂuence of incentive regulation on
investment behaviour using ﬁrm-level data, not controlling for ownership unbundling or
focussing on end-user prices. Also, they do not report the long run eﬀects of regulation.
To sum up, economic theory reports ambiguous eﬀects concerning the pros and cons
of ownership unbundling which calls for an empirical assessment. To date, no empirical
study has isolated the eﬀect of ownership unbundling and evaluated its long-run eﬀect
on natural gas retail prices. With this study we ﬁll this gap by trying to support these
discussions with empirical evidence and answering the question as to whether or not this
action has brought about beneﬁcial outcomes.
7 Regarding electricity, this has been explicitly analysed by Nagayama (2009). He deﬁnes one single
indicator, the so-called liberalisation model, subsuming information on various areas of regulation,
such as e.g. price regulation and consumer protection. Applying an ordered probit model he shows
that the selection of a certain liberalisation model by a country is inﬂuenced by electricity prices.
8 Brau et al. (2010), for example, apply system GMM, but only lagged dependent variables are
instrumented. Potential endogeneity of regulatory indicators is not tackled.
5Table 1: Overview of empirical studies
Study Countries (Time)
Sector(s)







- End-user prices industry





- Time to privatisation
- Time to liberalisation
- GDP
- Share of nuclear power





- Third party access (-)








- End-user prices industry
- Ratio of end-user prices
- OECD database3)
- Power exchange
- Time to privatisation
- Time to liberalisation
- GDP
- Share of nuclear power
- Share of hydro
FE, RE Price levels
- Market opening (-)





























- End-user prices industry - MOM database
- Lagged






- Tariﬀ structure (-)








- Generation per capita
















































- OECD database3) - GDP per capita
- Gas production per
capita
- Gas imports per capita
- Oil price (Brent)













(ﬁrm-level data; 23 TSOs
and DSOs)
- Investment rate - Incentive regulation
- X-factor
- Allowed cost of capital
- Owenership
- Energy supply per GDP


















- Eﬃciency (plant load,
network losses)




- Unbundling of networks
- Open network access
- Privatisation
- Population
- GDP per capita












- Unit operational costs - Ownership unbundling - Connection density
- Output (kWh)
- Quality (SAIDI)
FE, RE - Ownership unbundling
Source: Own compilation. 1) Estimators: FE (ﬁxed eﬀects), RE (random eﬀects), GMM (generalized method of moments), IV (instrumental
variable), 2SLS (two stage least squares) and LSDVC (bias-corrected least-squares dummy variable). 2) Main identiﬁed eﬀects. (+) signals an
increasing and (-) a decreasing eﬀect on the dependent variable(s). 3) OECD indicators of regulation in energy, transport and communications
(ETCR).
73 Data
In order to analyse the eﬀect of regulatory reforms on end-user prices with a special
focus on ownership unbundling we construct a panel consisting of 18 EU countries en-
compassing 1989 through 2007. While the starting date has been chosen because no
major changes in gas market regulations have occurred before 1990 in the considered
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Figure 1: End-user prices [USD2000/107 kcal]
As market liberalisation is a step-wise process, typically starting with opening up
the segment of large industrial customers for competition and ending with residential
consumers (Joskow, 2008), we focus on end-user prices for households since they indicate
the eﬀects of regulatory reforms best. We use net-of-tax natural gas prices in real
terms of the database Energy Prices & Taxes published by the International Energy
Agency (IEA) expressed in USD2000/107 kcal. Figure 1 shows the price dynamics in
9 The analysis has an EU focus and is based on the OECD database, indicators of regulation in energy,
transport and communications (ETCR), that provides information for 19 EU Member States (out of
a whole sample of 29 OECD countries). With no data on household gas prices available for Sweden
leaves us with 18 countries.
8the considered EU countries with residential end-user prices being compared to industry
prices.10
The overall picture across countries is rather heterogeneous. Not only do price levels
diﬀer substantially, but the development over time also varies considerably. Southern
European countries, i.e. Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, are among the ones with the
highest residential end-user prices and the largest gap between households and industry,
though the diﬀerence in most of them has diminished over time. While almost all
Member States have higher residential end-user prices than for industry, the eastern
European countries that joined the EU in 2004, reported the opposite at the beginning
of the period.
To account for changes in regulatory regimes of the considered countries we rely on
the OECD indicators for regulation in energy, transport and communications (ETCR)
as it secures data consistency. The ETCR dataset provides yearly time series up to
2007. Following the arguments of Brau et al. (2010) we use information of the sub-
indicators instead of applying the main indicators: besides the more or less arbitrarily
chosen weighting structure11, using aggregate indicators leads to a loss of information.
Moreover, eﬀects of a distinct regulatory measure cannot be identiﬁed. Since this paper
analyses the eﬀects of ownership unbundling, we concentrate in the setup of our regula-
tory indicators on the information provided by the basic questions underlying the overall
OECD indicator and amend this data where necessary. With regard to the coding of the
ETCR dataset, Brau et al. (2010) point to the problem of the arbitrary cardinalisation
of often categorical variables into the 0-6 scale that may inﬂuence results. Therefore,
if not otherwise mentioned, we apply discrete variables instead of the 0-6 scale. All
regulatory indicators are coded in a way that higher values correspond with conditions
usually being assumed to be more restrictive regarding competition. Thus, positive signs
are expected in the estimations.
A ﬁrst set of indicators deals with conditions of market entry. Concerning third-
party access to the transmission network, the discrete variable TPA is introduced with
0 indicating regulated access, 1 negotiated access and 2 otherwise. In order to measure
the eﬀect of giving customers access to alternative suppliers so that they have the choice
among diﬀerent oﬀers, we create the continuous variable Liberal. As information on the
actual degree of market opening is provided, the variable is designed as 100% minus
the given percentage. An increasing share of customers who can choose among several
suppliers should lead to an increase of the competitive pressure in this segment resulting
in lower end-user prices. Limitations on access to production or import markets are
covered by the discrete variable Barriers.12
For the privatisation eﬀorts of the various countries ETCR provides for three variables
indicating the percentage of the sector owned by the government. As these indicators
are highly correlated and in order to circumvent multicollinearity, the given informa-
10 All price data will enter estimations in log-form. The absolute values in Figure 1 are just for
visualisation purposes. Descriptive statistics can be found in the Appendix.
11 See Footnote 6.
12 In particular, it is asked if any regulations are in place that restrict the number of competitors
allowed to operate a business in at least some upstream markets.
9tion is condensed to one single variable Ownership by simple averaging and discretising
thereafter. Since private entities are generally assumed to perform more eﬃciently, the
indicator is 0 if the public share is less than 25%, 1 if the share is below 50%, 2 if it is
less than 75% and 3 otherwise.13
The main issue of this paper - ownership unbundling of gas TSOs - is not covered by
the OECD database. Therefore, we create a new dummy OU TSO indicating whether
a country has introduced ownership unbundling (OU TSO = 0) or not (OU TSO = 1).
While ﬁve countries have established ownership unbundling after having legally unbun-
dled their gas TSOs ﬁrst, Poland and Portugal directly shifted from vertically integrated
utilities to ownership unbundling. Therefore, to distinguish whether lower end-user
prices are caused by the most rigid form of vertical separation or just by breaking up
formerly vertically integrated gas utilities, we introduce a second dummy V I TSO. This
variable becomes 0 if at least legal unbundling has been implemented and 1 otherwise.14
From the OECD indicators for vertical separation only the one for gas distribution is
added to the variable list (V I DSO).15 Since only two characteristics are actually re-
ported in the ETCR dataset, the variable spoils down to a dummy with 0, indicating a
(not further speciﬁed) form of separation of gas distribution system operators (DSOs)
and 1 otherwise.
The last set of indicators deals with market structures in the competitive parts of
the value chain, i.e. production/import (MS Prod) and supply (MS Supp).16 ETCR
provides for ranges indicating the importance of the largest player. The corresponding
two variables are coded as follows: a 0 indicates that the largest utility has a share of less
than 50% in the relevant sector, 1 with a share between 50 and 90%, and 2 otherwise.
We expect retail prices to increase with market concentration.
To avoid misspeciﬁcations of our model, we consider several control variables which
may inﬂuence end-user prices for households, i.e. sector-speciﬁc factors like the total
amount of gas supplied to customers, the indigenous gas production, natural gas imports
and exports as well as macroeconomic indicators like the GDP, all expressed as per capita
variables. Due to the close relation between oil and gas, the oil price is additionally taken
into account. We use West Texas Intermediate (WTI) prices to map the oil price because
13 A correlation matrix for the various indicators, including the four main indicators of the ETCR
dataset, can be found in the Appendix. The created variable Ownership is highly collinear to each
of the original three OECD sub-indicators for public ownership.
14 The information on both dummy variables has been collected from various benchmarking reports
of the European Commission and checked by personal interviews with the designated regulated
authorities. Both variables show no problematic correlation. Details on both dummies are provided
in the Appendix.
15 The other two ETCR indicators covering the separation of the production and the supply segment
are dropped for two reasons. First, correlations with indicators for entry regulation are rather high
facing the risk of multicollinearity. Second, vertical separation is usually discussed in the sense of
essential facilities with the potential of being a natural monopoly. While this is true for gas pipelines
(transmission and distribution), production and supply are clearly competitive parts of the value
chain. See e.g. Gordon et al. (2003).
16 The third category of the OECD, the market structure in gas transmission, has been neglected due
to the - at least - questionable relevance and data inconsistencies.
10gas prices are expressed in USD and WTI has been widely applied in international
comparisons (cf. e.g. Brown and Y¨ ucel, 2007).
Concerning the development of natural gas end-user prices, it can often be observed
that industry prices adjust faster to these sector-speciﬁc and macroeconomic factors
than residential end-user prices. Therefore, industry prices may function as a kind of
transmission belt between these factors and the prices for households. An auxiliary ﬁxed
eﬀects regression reveals that industrial prices are indeed signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by per-
capita GDP, the oil price and per-capita gas production but not by residential end-user
prices and per-capita natural gas import.17 Therefore, natural gas imports as well as
end-user prices for industry are chosen as control variables with the latter serving as a
kind of instrument for GDP and natural gas production. Regarding the industrial gas
prices, a negative (and signiﬁcant) coeﬃcient would indicate a higher demand elasticity,
whereas a positive sign would just show a level eﬀect on residential end-user prices.18
However, as the oil price is of special importance for the gas market, it additionally
enters the set of control variables. Not only are several gas contracts in Europe still
indexed to oil, but oil is also a close substitute for gas in the heating market; this is
of particular interest for the residential end-user market. For annual data it is quite
common to use also the one-year lagged oil price as the adjustment process of gas prices
is lagged by around six months (cf. e.g. Siliverstovs et al., 2005).
4 Empirical Analysis
To analyse the eﬀect of ownership unbundling on retail prices, certain econometric prob-
lems have to be tackled. The ﬁrst one is that longitudinal price data might be biased
by autocorrelation or cluster-correlation. Approaches that assume independence of ob-
servations - like the traditional ﬁxed eﬀects and random eﬀects estimator - generally
underestimate the true variance leading to inﬂated t-statistics. To avoid possibly cor-
responding inconsistency problems we use a robust variance estimator (cf. Froot, 1989;
Williams, 2000). This estimator allows for heteroscedasticity, both between and within
clusters, and for serial correlation.
A second econometric challenge is that causality between the institutional change in
regulation and prices might not be unique, but reciprocal. Then, explanatory variables
are correlated with the error term (endogeneity problem). To address endogeneity, we
apply the System Generalized Method of Moments estimator (system GMM, Blundell
and Bond, 1998), which uses lagged (endogenous) variables as instruments. We model all
regulatory indicators as endogenous variables.19 Furthermore, we allow gas imports to
17 A preceding correlation analysis shows that gas supply, production as well as exports are highly
collinear. Therefore, only the production variable enters the regression. Results for both, the
correlation analysis as well as the regression, are presented in the Appendix.
18 This design also captures the eﬀect, if industrial end-user prices gain more from regulatory reforms
(higher demand elasticity) which has been shown by Steiner (2001) and Hattori and Tsutsui (2004)
for electricity.
19 Modelling the indicators strictly exogenous leads to a rejection of the Sargan test indicating that
regulatory reforms - at least partly - have been driven by high end-user prices for households.
11be endogenous as causality between the dependent variable and imports can be assumed
to be bidirectional. Using the standard treatment for endogenous variables, lags of
order two and higher for the transformed equation and lag one for the levels equation
are speciﬁed (cf. Roodman, 2006, 2008). The remaining regressors are treated as strictly
exogenous instrumenting themselves.
Third, our data set is rather small, as it covers only 18 countries. Nickell (1981)
has shown that the conventional least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator for
dynamic panels is inconsistent for a ﬁnite time horizon T and a large number of cross-
sectional dimensions N (Nickell, 1981). Furthermore, with only 18 countries we likely
face the problem of a small sample bias. Therefore, consistent Instrumental Variable (IV)
estimators like Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
estimators like Arellano and Bond (1991) might be biased (Kiviet, 1995). Kiviet (1995,
1999) as well as (Bun and Kiviet, 2003) provide for techniques to approximate the small
sample bias but deliver consistent results only for balanced panels. With the unbalanced
nature of our panel, adopting those corrections would lead to a high loss of information
as they would in fact require discarding the cross-sections or time series causing the
imbalance. Therefore, we apply the corrected least-squares dummy variable (LSDVC)
estimator by (Bruno, 2005) whose approach avoids the aforementioned shortcomings.
The small sample bias is approximated via bootstrapping.
For our empirical analysis, we model the log end-user price for residential costumers
yit of country i and period t as a function the regulatory indicators Rit of the current and
one year lagged oil price Xit, and other control variables Zit including industry prices
and market structure. ηi captures unobserved heterogeneity across countries and ǫit is
the error term satisfying the usual assumptions.
A dynamic setting additionally allows for some gas price dynamics by introducing one
and two years lagged end-user prices as further explanatory variables.20
yit = α1yit−1 + α2yit−2 + Ritρ + Xitβ + Zitδ + ηi + ǫit. (1)
Given the lagged endogenous variables, we can calculate the long run eﬀect of regulation




1 − α1 − α2
. (2)
The results of our three model speciﬁcations evaluating the impact of regulatory re-
forms, and ownership unbundling in particular, on end-user prices of residential cus-
tomers are listed in Table 2. The parameter values indicate the short-run eﬀects (im-
pact multipliers). Overall, we obtain robust results throughout all three estimators. In
none of our models does ownership unbundling (OU TSO) seem to have any signiﬁcant
eﬀect on retail prices. The same holds for vertical separation of distribution networks
(V I DSO). However, countries which at least legally unbundled transmission networks
20 A twice lagged dependent variable is required to obtain valid results of the Arellano-Bond AR(2)
test for the system GMM and LSDVC estimator to prevent autocorrelation in the error terms.
12from the rest of the value chain (V I TSO) indeed show lower retail prices. This holds
especially true on the long run, where the eﬀect approximately doubles. Apart from that,
only one regulatory variable, third party-access (TPA), has the expected sign. Countries
without regulated TPA have signiﬁcantly higher natural gas prices than others. Again,
this eﬀect is twice as high in the long run. Neither market liberalisation (Liberal) nor
the existence of limitations on access to production or import markets (Barriers) have
signiﬁcant price eﬀects. Interestingly, a higher share of publicly owned companies (Own-
ership) reduces natural gas retail prices. This result corresponds to previous empirical
studies (e.g. Alesina et al., 2005; Brau et al., 2010).
Looking at the control variables, the oil price is signiﬁcant in all estimations. The
positive sign is consistent with expectations as the oil price should control for the fact
that many contracts still link the gas price to the development of the oil price. The
lagged adjustment process embedded in long-term gas contracts is represented by the
signiﬁcance of the lagged oil price. The overall eﬀect, which is here the sum of LogOil
and LogOilt−1, is of similar magnitude across all approaches. End-user prices are raised
by about 2.8 % if the oil price increases by 10 %.
Table 2: End-user prices and the impact of regulatory reforms
Log Price hh Fixed eﬀects One-step system GMM LSDVC (BB)
Log Price hht−1 0.684*** 0.682*** 0.709***
(0.061) (0.056) (0.067)
Log Price hht−2 −0.180*** −0.170*** −0.183***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.046)
TPA 0.045** 0.047** 0.047**
(0.020) (0.019) (0.023)
Long Run Multiplier 0.092** 0.097** 0.098**
(0.036) (0.035) (0.049)
Liberal 0.023 −0.029 −0.018
(0.042) (0.045) (0.041)
Long Run Multiplier 0.047 −0.059 −0.038
(0.086) (0.031) (0.086)
Barriers −0.003 −0.005 −0.003
(0.017) (0.018) (0.020)
Long Run Multiplier −0.007 −0.010 −0.006
(0.034) (0.036) (0.043)
Ownership −0.033* −0.033* −0.026*
(0.017) (0.018) (0.015)
Long Run Multiplier −0.067* −0.067* −0.056*
(0.035) (0.037) (0.032)
VI TSO 0.082** 0.082** 0.082**
(0.028) (0.029) (0.032)
13Table 2: continued
Log Price hh Fixed eﬀects One-step system GMM LSDVC (BB)
Long Run Multiplier 0.165*** 0.167*** 0.173**
(0.051) (0.054) (0.072)
OU TSO 0.052 0.049 0.042
(0.030) (0.032) (0.040)
Long Run Multiplier 0.104 0.100 0.089
(0.060) (0.066) (0.083)
VI DSO 0.009 0.008 0.008
(0.014) (0.016) (0.030)
Long Run Multiplier 0.018 0.017 0.017
(0.029) (0.132) (0.063)
Log Oil 0.168*** 0.284*** 0.164***
(0.036) (0.069) (0.046)
Log Oilt−1 0.109** −0.052 0.102**
(0.038) (0.129) (0.039)
MS Prod 0.123*** 0.112** 0.108**
(0.041) (0.044) (0.051)
MS Supp −0.080* −0.073 −0.075**
(0.042) (0.050) (0.034)
Import pc −0.111* −0.126* −0.113
(0.057) (0.068) (0.080)
Log Price ind 0.097** 0.104*** 0.102**
(0.041) (0.033) (0.047)
Year dummies yes yes yes
R squared (within) 0.852 − −
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test − 0.339 0.771
No. of observations 195 195 195
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and to within group serial cor-
relation. LSDVC: initialized with the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator (BB) and standard errors
calculated via bootstrapping (1,000 runs); AR(2) test with regard to ﬁrst step BB estimation. Standard
errors for long run eﬀects have been calculated with the delta method. ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance
at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Concerning eﬀects of market structures, the results for our market concentration vari-
ables are ambiguous. As expected, prices rise with an increase in market concentration on
the wholesale level (MS Prod). At the same time, market concentration in natural gas
service (MS Supp) tends to reduce retail prices. This counterintuitive result is caused
by two eﬀects. First, countries with relatively low end-user prices at the beginning of our
14observation period report higher initial concentration rates (e.g. eastern European coun-
tries). Second, a reduction of MS Supp quite often coincides with an increase in retail
prices (e.g. France, Hungary, Ireland and The Netherlands). However, results should
be treated with care as this variable exhibits only a very low within-variation. Import
volumes (Import pc) inﬂuence retail prices in 2 out of 3 models as expected: prices drop
with increasing supply. However, the variable is only weakly signiﬁcant. The trade-oﬀ
between industrial and residential end-user prices as shown by Steiner (2001) as well
as by Hattori and Tsutsui (2004) cannot be conﬁrmed in our estimation. Indeed, the
positive signs of the variable LogPrice ind indicate that high industrial prices go along
with higher household prices.
To sum up, all three of our estimators, the FE estimation with robust standard er-
rors, the System-GMM and the dynamic LSDVC, lead to similar results. None of the
approaches ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of ownership unbundling on the level of end-user
prices for residential customers.
5 Conclusions
Ownership unbundling of gas transmission system operators (TSOs) as the most rigid
form of vertical disintegration from competitive and regulated operations is still an issue
in the discussions about a suitable future regulatory framework of the European gas
market. The controversial debate preceding the third legislative package has led to a
compromise that allows now for both legal and ownership unbundling, and leaves the
choice to Member States. However, the problem of whether or not the rigid ownership
unbundling is economically more beneﬁcial than other forms of unbundling has not yet
been solved. While economic theory reports ambiguous results, we have answered the
question empirically by analysing the developments of natural gas end-user prices in
diﬀerent countries of which some already have established ownership unbundling (e.g.
U.K.) while others have not (e.g. France).
Analysing an unbalanced panel of 18 EU countries over 19 years with a number of
static as well as dynamic estimators reveals no evidence for a price-decreasing eﬀect of
ownership unbundling. However, the breaking-up of formerly vertically integrated TSOs
with at least introducing the more modest legal unbundling has resulted in lower end-
user prices. Furthermore, third-party access and privatisation show signiﬁcant inﬂuence
with the latter leading to higher price levels. Their eﬀect even doubles in the long run.
These results are consistent across our estimations.
From a policy point of view, our results do not support a further separation of the
diﬀerent stages of the natural gas value chain. On the contrary, as countries which at
least legally separated transmission networks already seem to have reaped the economic
beneﬁts, a further tightening of unbundling rules for gas TSOs does not seem to be
economically reasonable.
However, as most of the countries in our analysis established ownership have unbun-
dled gas TSOs only very recently, our results should be treated with care. To arrive
at a clearer picture on this issue a re-evaluation might be carried out in few years. An
15interesting topic for further research could be the empirical analysis of the impact of
diﬀerent forms of vertical separation of transmission networks on the investment level in
the European gas sector. Regarding the dynamic eﬃciency, a debate is currently going
on that is very similar to the one that has been at the centre of this paper.
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18Appendix
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics and information on the unbundling status of gas TSOs
Country Log Price hha Log Price inda Log Oilb Import pcc TSO unbundlingb
Legal Ownership
Austria 5.896 5.121 − 0.703 2002 −
(0.142) (0.086) (0.169)
Belgium 5.917 5.004 − 1.161 2001 −
(0.113) (0.156) (0.218)
Czech Rep. 6.037 6.099 − 0.664 2006 −
(0.234) (0.190) (0.106)
Denmark 5.943 − − 0.000 2001 2005
(0.247) (0.000)
Finland 4.833 4.731 − 0.606 − −
(0.224) (0.128) (0.120)
France 5.963 5.175 − 0.550 2004 −
(0.098) (0.240) (0.088)
Germany 5.814 5.096 − 0.725 2005 −
(0.090) (0.120) (0.126)
Greece 6.051 5.556 − 0.094 2007 −
(0.124) (0.181) (0.102)
Hungary 5.799 5.924 − 0.685 2000 2006
(0.206) (0.285) (0.198)
Ireland 6.092 5.594 − 0.392 − −
(0.183) (0.387) (0.362)
Italy 6.143 5.182 − 0.689 2002 −
(0.071) (0.079) (0.230)
Luxembourg 5.639 − − 1.701 − −
(0.126) (0.569)
Netherlands 5.800 4.968 − 0.556 2004 2005
(0.161) (0.181) (0.421)
Poland 6.068 5.844 − 0.176 − 2005
(0.503) (0.133) (0.031)
Portugal 6.804 5.840 − 0.135 − 2006
(0.024) (0.095) (0.146)
Slovak Rep. 5.758 5.919 − 0.955 2006 −
(0.462) (0.181) (0.117)
Spain 6.431 5.372 − 0.341 2001 2006
(0.093) (0.185) (0.217)
UK 5.891 5.034 − 0.108 1996 1997
(0.146) (0.291) (0.111)
All 5.891 5.419 3.248 0.569 − −
(0.419) (0.473) (0.353) (0.469)
Notes: For the ﬁrst four variables mean values as well as standard deviations (in brackets) are
presented. aEnd-user prices for households (hh) and industry (ind) in USD2000/107 kcal. Source: IEA.
bWTI oil price in USD2000/barrel. Source: IEA. cGas imports (ktoe) per capita. Source: IEA. dDate
of implementation (legal enactment). Source: Benchmarking Reports of the European Commission as
well as interviews of the designated regulatory authorities.
19Table A.2: Correlation matrix of regulatory indicators


































Liberalb .849 .817 1
Barrieresb .738 .350 .339 1
Ownershipa .419 .202 .282 .403 1
PO Prodb .428 .223 .264 .448 .894 1
PO TSOb .380 .175 .211 .425 .901 .940 1
PO DSOb .245 .094 .081 .289 .767 .768 .780 1
Ownership .368 .163 .198 .420 .907 .969 .975 .812 1
VIa .550 .582 .575 .255 .215 .214 .118 .122 .149 1
VI Prodb .469 .429 .421 .312 .147 .157 .060 .056 .085 .832 1
VI Suppb .723 .676 .768 .348 .331 .293 .233 .148 .238 .710 .446 1
VI DSOb .082 .248 .179 −.111 .041 .050 .011 .089 .042 .607 .146 .305 1
VI TSO .697 .630 .684 .389 .351 .332 .251 .225 .271 .734 .598 .711 .330 1
OU TSO .419 .306 .418 .226 .272 .263 .132 .231 .184 .419 .393 .441 .095 .544 1
Structurea .463 .341 .520 .300 .520 .477 .442 .169 .431 .371 .303 .435 .100 .397 .244 1
MS Prodb .519 .398 .551 .271 .526 .506 .415 .295 .418 .431 .398 .472 .075 .516 .378 .792 1
MS Suppb .284 .235 .343 .196 .394 .337 .327 .099 .321 .325 .219 .291 .218 .265 .179 .855 .473 1
MS TSOb .297 .157 .340 .264 .296 .278 .310 −.029 .279 .070 .065 .263 −.128 .125 −.032 .722 .376 .480 1
Note: aAggregate indicator of the OECD database ETCR; bSub-indicator of the OECD database ETCR.
2
0Table A.3: Correlation matrix and auxiliary ﬁxed eﬀects estimation for control variables
A. Correlation matrix
Variable Log Price ind Log Oil Supply pc Prod pc Export pc Import pc GDP pc
Log Price inda 1
Log Oila .325 1
Supply pcb −.267 −.036 1
Prod pcc −.302 −.085 .848 1
Export pcc −.250 −.065 .784 .939 1
Import pcc .102 .103 .229 −.232 −.051 1
GDP pcd −.670 .082 .336 .275 .247 .091 1
B. Fixed eﬀects estimatione
Variable Log Price hh Log Oil Prod pc Import pc GDP Year dummy R squared (within) No. of obs.
Log Price ind −0.002 0.555*** −0.227** 0.074 −0.616*** yes 0.559 233
(0.059) (0.092) (0.102) (0.269) (0.166)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and to within group serial correlation. ***, **, * denote signiﬁ-
cance at 1%, 5% and 10%. a End-user prices for industry in USD2000/107 kcal. Source: IEA. b WTI oil price in USD2000/barrel. Source: IEA.
c Total gas supply (Supply pc), gas production (Prod pc), gas exports (Export pc) and gas imports (Import pc) all in ktoe per capita. Source:
IEA. d Gross domestic product in 104 USD2000 per capita. Source: IEA. e Based on a ﬁxed eﬀects estimator with robust standard errors (Froot
1989 and Williams 2000). Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and to within group serial correlation. ***, **, * denote
signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10%. The counterintuitive result of the negative impact of GDP per capita is caused by a cross-sectional (eastern
European countries with a relatively small GDP per capita tend to have higher end-user prices) and a time series eﬀect (decreasing end-user
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